
# Approved For Release 2008/05/08: CIA-RDP89B00423R000100040037-1 ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY



MEMORANDUM FOR:	Deputy Director for Intelligence	•
VIA:	Director of Soviet Analysis	
FROM:		STAT
2.1.3/.10	Chief, Current Support Division Office of Soviet Analysis	
SUBJECT:	Request for Permission to Give an Oral Presentation	
REFERENCE:		STAT
national securit	st permission to give oral presentations on the subjects of the CIA and y and on the Soviet leadership (see attached	STAT STAT
request).		
2. To the presented is cla	best of my knowledge none of the material ssified.	
<ol><li>My presessentially the</li></ol>	entation on the CIA and national security will be same lecture I have given at other universities,  The lecture	
on the Soviet le for the Chernenk	adership will be an assessment of the prospects o regime.	
that the views e	I will be identified as a with the CIA and will make the standard disclaimer expressed are mine and not necessarily those of	
the Agency. I w	would not need commercial lodgings, but would stay	
overnight with a	n old colleague.	STAT STAT
		STAT

# ADMINISTRTIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Request for Permission to Give an Oral Presentation

I have reviewed the attached request and with the understanding that the presentation will be unclassified, approve it.

Acting Director of Soviet Analysis

Date

Date

Deputy Director for Intelligence

3 APR

STAT

**STAT** 

Date

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	DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
ebruary 15, 1984	
A mutual friend, pefore the Senate Intelligence C	has shown me a copy of your testimony Committee Your
rescience on that o <u>ccasion is m</u> f you could come to change in the leadership of the	nost impressive and we would be honored speak to us about the most recent Soviet Union.
listory of the Soviet Union on to Where Now?" As well, we invite nterested students on the subject of the subje	have you speak to my class in the the subject: "The Soviet Leadership you to address our majors and other ect of: "The C.I.A. and National Security." ching a course in Central and Eastern also expressed a desire to have you address nderstand if you felt that two talks in one ddress his class it could be on a subject of concern the World War II era.
concrete dates. Our first choic  If you came, you would to our majors and perhaps to	address my class on Monday and would speak class on Tuesday. If these dates are exible as long as we have about ten days
f you could manage to come talk	a particularly busy time for you. Still, to us it would be an invaluable experine members of our department as well.
Perv trinv vours.	
••	:

STAT

# The CIA and National Security

- I. Intelligence Gathering & Assessment
  - A. Long History
    - 1. Moses, Joshua and Caleb
    - 2. George Washington
    - 3. Thru codebreakers of WWII
  - B. Every country has intelligence organization of some sort.
- II. Extent to Which Intelligence a Recognized and Legitimized Function in Current Era
  - A. Read Several of Technical Articles of 1972 SALT Agreements.
    - 1. At time, everything referred to in these articles classified TS by USSR.
    - 2. Ability to negotiate such an agreement with such a secret society as USSR only possible because of groundwork laid by intell collection and analysis over many years. Not because they openly release any of this information.
  - B. Moreover, Article XII of ABM Treaty
    - No open inspections of any sort or responsibility to provide information openly.
    - Only example, to my knowledge, where treaties openly ratified by legislatures of both sides state, in effect, it is up to each side's intelligence services to monitor compliance.

(I will not, under any circumstances, get into issue of whether or not Soviets are indeed complying.)

- C. Other Examples: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
  - Signed and ratified by countries.

- Unlike SALT, on-site inspections with multinational inspectors.
- 3. Any signatory realizes that it may fool safeguards inspectors, but has additional worry; i.e., intelligence efforts of others involved.
- 4. According to NPT, any signatory can choose nationality of its inspectors. Again, final barrier against circumvention is intelligence effort. Even if a country would find a colluding inspector, could not be certain it could fool intelligence agencies involved.
- III. So intell a vital link in the most sensitive relationships of the modern world—
  - A. Vital not only in bilateral relations, but in areas critical to security of all.
  - B. No country with leadership responsibility in this era can play its role responsibly without first-rate intell service.
  - IV. We at CIA consider ourselves to have one primary function.
    - A. To give the policymaker the most accurate information humanly possible for him to base his policy decisions on.
    - B. It is asking much for him to make correct decisions on basis of faulty information or assessments.
    - C. Are we always right? No. Only someone who possessed full clairvoyance could be that.
    - D. Besides, many situations ambiguous, decisions must be made on basis of developing/changing events.
    - E. But we're satisfied that we work hard and long with the best people available to give him the best possible material.

#### The Soviet Leadership

Change of leaders Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko much too short for Soviet style.

# Andropov legacy continuity

` Focused on need to rejuvenate elite and economy

"Country moving again"

Chose administrative measures (disc and anti-corruption)

Make it work better rather than change it

## On foreign policy--arms control

- ` Failure INF and START. Dead end
- ` Relations with West Europe worsened
- ` Only gains in mid-east can't be translated
- ` So leaves little of consequence

#### What can Chernenko achieve?

` Probably little; interim leader. \_

Continuation of Brezhnev legacy

Supported by regional leaders and government ministries
--the most conservative and threatened
``Cite Chernenko's original speech.

#### Doesn't mean nothing can be accomplished

- Obviously trying escape dead-end of Andropov's arms control policy
- Trying rebuild in Europe--Stockholm conference, MBFR, and meeting W. Europeans

### But domestically, appears little hope

- ` GNP growth in 1983 will even further discourage economic tinkering
- Discipline campaign and anti-corruption bound to slip
  The Old Guard still in power

#### Next succession will be the deep one

- Gorbachev likely; true generational change
- The Old Guard will all go. Actuarial tables say so.

Young managers like Dolgikh and Ryzhkov.

- ` Will be problems that must finally be addressed
- Resource problems will dictate policies

# So chances are that next succession will make a difference.

- But how?
- Different opinions

The Soviet Leadership (continued)

My assessment; more vigorous, effort to update, desire for more western technology, more dialogue with West